INTRODUCTION

Can a waste package be developed that can be demonstrated to have reasonable assw'ance of lasting I0,000
The developmentof "long-lived" or "robuSt" waste years? packageshas beenadvocated by theNuclearWaste Technical Review BoardI (NWTRB) and others as a means of ensur'ing 2. What ambientconditions orfactors needtobe modified that theexpected performance ofa potential high-level nuclear for a 10,000-year wastepackagetobe attained ii' this, indeed, is wasterepository attheYucca Mountain Sitewill notonlymeet notyet possible? regulatory requirements butwillbe acceptable tothepublic as weil. The fundamental premiseunderlying this position was 3. flowwould theprobability of attaining a 10,000'year statedby the NWTRBI: "... theBoard believes thatweilwaste packagebe influenced iftheas-emplaced heatgeneration engineered structures arelessvariable and more predictable rate ofindividual canisters wereminimized? thanrockformations [emphasis added]." Thisiscertainly true 4. flowdoesthesiting of therepository inan unsaturated when thetime, span fortheprediction is comparableto the zone, as opposedtoa saturated zone,affect attaining a 10,000-period overwhichwe haveexperience withsimilar structures.
year waste package7
However, a unique feature common to all potential nuclear The crucial problem in addressing these questions --waste repositories is thatconfidence must be developed in the perhapsitiseven the crucial pax)blem fortheentire nuclear , accuracy of performance predictions spanning 10,000 years or' waste program --is the demonstration with reasonable more. This time period is far longer than human history and assurance that the repository or any part of it will perform as about two orders of magnitude greater than the engineering t_ experience span for most anthropogenic materials. Much of inten.ded. Developing the necessary scientific understanding of natural, altcxed, and rrmnufacturcd components' behavior under ' society's confidence in engine.er_ structures is based upon observations of how well they perform their intended functions current and projected conditions, performing the subsequent over their design lifetimes. Unfor_mately, there are no such engineering de.sign work, and actually constructing the observations even for many of the component materials repository and its subsystems are ali familiar tasks, distinguished considered for engineered barriers, and certainly not for entire only by the physical and temporal scale of the undertaking (and systems resembling a repository. Hence,an enginoerexl barrier perhaps by therigor and pervasiveness of Quality Assurance requirements) from other large projects.
What seems more presently known about the failure time distribution for any part daunting is making it ali plausible when we're done, The of the engineered "barrier system, lt is this fact that makes the considerations below are intended to suggest an approach which four questions raist.d by the NWTRB so extraordinarily difficult may ultimately help improve the credibility of more to answer. As will be illustrated below for multiple barriers sophisticated and detailed calculations, assumed to obey a simple exponential failure time distribution, the demonstzation of compliance with the regulatory _AITING TIMES requirement of "substantially complete containment" for periods of 300 to 1000 years will push the state-of-the-art in engineering°9 In very general terms, a repository comprises a series of and the frontiers of knowledge in science.
Extending the natural geologic, a_terexi zone, and engineered "barriers." The prediction time to periods of 10,000 or more years, as required unexcavated host rock, beyond the range of significant to defend "robust" designs, may be beyond our capabilities. ,. repository-induced change21 in such properties as temperature and water content, comprises the natural geologic barrier system.
The engineered barrier system, or EBS, includes conrponents traditionally regarded as part of the waste package, P__ ROBABILITIES such as the waste form itself, the pour cannister (for glass waste) or the fuel cladding (for spent fuel), and the actual emplacement Consider a single system which can fail at any time t > 0. cannister (which may itself have several layers of different To be specific, the system is considered to be the waste package materials). The altered zone includes unexcavated rock with component in a multiple-component EBS; however, it should be properties that have either been deliberately changed during noted that a precise operational definition of "failure" for a repository construction and pre-closure operations (e.g., by waste package is far from obvious and may even depend upon changing the local chemistry) or that have been changed the mode of release (i.e., vapor phase versus liquid phase incidentally as a result of repository construction and operation transport of radionuclides). Is a single corrosion pit resulting in (e.g., by the drying of surrounding rock due to heat from a 5 micron hole through a cannister wall a "failure," or should radioactive decay and the movement of ventilation air).
there be more holes or larger holes before it is considered to have failed7 The classical del'rail:ion given by Harr 2, that failure Each barrier introduces a delay or waiting time into a denotes "...the inability of a system to perform its intended sequence of events that '3egins with waste emplacement and function," would in the ease of the EBS mean that the EBS ends with release of a detectable quantity of a particuiar either has ceased to provide "substantially complete radionuclide totheaccet_sibleenvironment, containment" or to comply with the conta'olled release requirement 3, which limits the fractional release for each For example, consider a particle of liquid water starting at radionuclide to 10-5 of its inventory remaining 1000 years after some point above the repository. The first waiting time is the closure. Unfortunately, substantially complete containment is time it takes this particle to reach the altered zone surrounding the repository (note that the dme could be infinite ff the flow not defmeA precisely, hence we ao not have a complete path does not intersect any radionuclide inventory). Assuming it quantitative regulatory criterion for determining when failure reaches the altered zone, it must then traverse it and contact the has oc "lrred.
next barrier, which nfight be the waste package, lt then has to penetrate one or more layers of the cannister, then the cladding The following discussion assunw.s that failure can be or the pour c:_t_nister(depending upon the waste package design del'meA and that the resulting definition distinguishes and the waste form), dissolve or entrain some radionuclide(s), unambiguously between a waste package that has failed and one that has not f_iled. The del'tuition or even detection of the work its way back through the EBS and the altered zone, failure of an engineered component in a repository environment traverse the vadose zone below the repository, and so on.
is by no means a trivial exercise, but further consideration of
The sum of ',di these waiting times for one such sequence is these subjects is beyond the scope of this paper. one value (i.e., realizeaion) of the release time for a single radionuclide "particle;" it will be a random variable, because Let f(t) represent the probability density function (pdt') for each individual term is a random wL,'iable. The ensemble of ali the random variable T, where T is the waiting time to failure for such release time reali_ations for the entire initial inventory of a single system being observed. In other words, the system is radionuclides is directly related to the cumulative distribution observed starting at time 0, and T is the time that has elapsed function for radionuclide release. In essence, the calculation of when failure occurs. Then f(t)dt is the probability that the repository performance reduces to the calculation of the observed value of T lies between t and t + dt. F(t) is the probability distribution for a sum of waiting times, each of cumulative distribution function (cdf) and is defined by the which is a random variable with an unknown probability integral: distribution. From this perspective, a repository's sole purpose t is to provide an acceptable distribution function for this sum --F(t) = f f(u)du. that is, the probability of release for the entire period of regulatory concern must remain extremely low. 0
At present, not even the form of the probability distribution The cdf is the probability that failure occurs on or before is known for any of these waiting limes ; a fortiori, we know time t. Note that 1 -F(t) is the probability that failure occurs neither the nature or number of the parameters of these after time t, i.e., the probability of survival until time t. ltarr 2 distributions, their values, or how these values might change refers to this function as the reliability function, R(t). lt is with environmental conditions. In particular, nothing is sometimes useful to define the hazard function, h(t) = f(t)/R(t);
itisa conditional pdf,inthat h(t)dt islhcconditional probability
The single parameter _. isthereciprocal of theMean Time that thesystem willfail inthetimeinterval fromttot+dt, given To Failure, or MTrF. The cdf isF(t)= I -e"_, and the that it survived until timet. reliability function isjuste-_. Not only isthisdistribution IfN wastepackagesareemplacedat time0, and their simple, itoften provides a good representation forfailure time failure probabilities atc independent (i.e., common disasters probabilities when failures are rare events resulting from the such as meteorite impacts on a repository are not considered), complex interaction of many processes and mechanisms.
' thenn, thetotal number of survivors attimet,isa discrete Examples of observed failure time statistics 'successfully random variable obeyingthefamiliar binomial distribution for described by thisdistribution aregiven in Figures1 and 2, theprobability of n successes inN Bernoulli trials when the , probability ofs,,ccess on eachtrial isR(t): respectively, fortheburnout ofradar tubes (fromBelz 4)andfor thecollapse of oil-well cas/ngdue tc, salt-flow loading (from
nl], [R(t)]n, IF(t)](N'n)
Chesnut and Goldbexg5). The points are the observed reliability values madthe lines show the reliability function for exponential distributions with the observed mean failure times.
The mean number of survivors is N,R(t), and the variance is N,F(t),R(t).
[Ufetlme Distribution tor V805 Radar Tubes In order to gain some insight into the demands placed on Figure 2 . Comparison of observed reliability data for casing in oil waste package performance testing and analysis by regulatory wells on the Cedar Creek Anticline, Montana, with the exponential requirements, a specific function must be assumed for the pdf. distribution. A total of 15 failures was observed, and the mean time Perhaps the simplest pdf for failure dme is the exponential to failure was 96.7 moc, ths5.
distribution:
These examples cle.arly must involve radically different f(t) = _e"_ failure mechanismsandprocesses, yetthedistributions offailure timesexhibit thesame simpleexponential form --only the
MTrF is different. Ali the complexity one can envision from
The waste package program will attempt to minimize the such sources as different mechanisms, environmental factors, duration of the "breaking-in" period by stringent quality control manufacturing differences, material behavior, etc. merely affects and rigorous inspection, thereby hoping to eliminate most of the the value of this single parameter. Precisely how the M'I"FF early failures and mitigate their consequences during the predepends upon "deterministic" variables must be determined closure period of repository operation. Ideally, this would allow either by experiments combined with mechanistic theoretical the period of constant hazard to extend beyond the time period analysis, or by statistical analysis of a sufficiently large number of interest, be it 300-1,000 years, 10,000 years, or longer. If this offailures, wereachieved, thelate-time peTiod of increasing hazardneed ' notbe included in theanalysis, since all of thedesignservice In probability theory, theexponential distribution arises in life wouldhaveexpired before it starts. the study of Poisson processes, in which the Probability that an event will occur in the time interval from t to t+dt is proportional The achievement of constant hazard, and proving that it has to dt (for sufficiently small dr) and independent of t. The been achieved, is a great scientific and engineering challenge. condition of _aae-independence means that there is no memory,
The analyses presented in the remainder of this paper assume or, in other words, no aging, so it is somewhat surprising that the that the challenge can be met, and we can accordingly assume exponential distribution fits thedataso wellinthetwo examples theexponential distribution tobe a reasonable functional form shown, forthefailure timedistaSbution. The MTrF offers a reasonable and simple ddf'mition forthelifetime ofa wastepackage or any Perhapsthe applicability of PoissonProcesses can be other componentof theEBS, whetheror notthefailure time rationalized, albeit not proven, by considering a conceptual distribution is expon_.ntial. Similar analyses can be perfomaed model for system failure known as the "bathtub distribution." In for other distributions, such as the Weibull, but other parameters Figure, 3 (see Hart2), the hazard function h(t) is sketched as a in addition to the mean would have to be specified in order to function of time.
produce any quantitative results. If warranted by experience or theory, these extensions can easily be made.
[Bathtub Hazard Distribution ] SINGLE BARRIE_IS
_"
We now assume that the exponential waiting time o_ I distribution can be used to describe the reliability of a ,,_ hypothetical single-barrier waste package. The formulas given gt above for the pdf and cdf of the exponential distribution, along _, with the formulas for the binomial distribution, were used to calcuhte numerical values for the reliability, R(t), the expected f0 ¢01N _ number of survivors, E(n,t), and the probability of 100% _k survival, PN(t) at t--40 years after emplacement and at 1=1,000 • years after emplacement, for assumed values of the M'rTF equal to 1,000, 10,000, 100,000, 1,000,000, and 10,000,000
years, The choices of 40 and 1,000 years were made to represent, respectively, the time from waste emplacement to repository closure and the period during which regulations Fl_gure 3. Sketch of the "Bathtub Distribution" for the hazard require "substantially complete containment" of radionuclides fu_actionvs, time. The early decreasing-hazard part is the "breakingwithin the EBS. .in" period, the central constant pan is the period of design service l'.itie, and the late increasing-hazard part is the "wearing-out" period. Table 1 . Reliability, expected number of survivot_, and probability of 100% survival at 40 and 1,000 years for ma initial population size of 35000 waste packages, with assumed values of the Mean Time to
At early time (the "breaking-in" period), h(t) is expected to Failureranging from la000 to 101000000 Years. These results are summarized in Table 1 . For ali tabulated values of MTrF less than or equal to 100,000 years, the f(_) = ;be"Lt probability of observi_g at least one failure in 40 years (this probability is one minus the probability of 100% survival) is R(!) = e'Lt essentially unity, virtually assuring that at least one failure would occur within this relatively short time even for very h(t), = f(t)/R(t) = _, "robust" designs.
Slightly less than 37% of the 1,000-year-MTrF packages where lk(0) is the total inventory of radionuclide k at would survive for 1,000 years, but almost 99% of the 100,000-emplacement. Then if we assume that failure means that release year-M'VIT packages would. Even for a MTTF of 1,000,000 of radionuclides from the EBS occurs, the release from time t to years, the probability of at least one failure in the f'L,'St 40 years is 0.75, and 0.1% of these packages would be expected to fail by time t + dt is just _.Ik(t)e-_dt. This expression can be integrated 1,000 years after emplacement, and then divided by the inventory at tc to obtain the normalized cumulative release function 8k(t): ' Note that the expected number of survivors at 40 years and 1,000 yeazs in Table 1 is just the reliability function evaluated at 40 and 1,000, respectively, times the initial number of packages 8k(t) = [_(°tk + _')]eC_te[1 " e'(otk + _.)t]. -(35,000).
The interested reader will note that only the 1,000,000-year-MTTF package has a reliability exceeding By expanding the last term at early time and retaining the 0.9999 at 40 years, and its reliability is only 0.9990 at 1,000 linear term in t, the following approximation can be derived:
years. Recalling that R(t) = e-_t, setting t = 1,000, R(t) = 0.9999 and solving for _ one can show that attaining "four-nines" 8k(t)-'-keaktet' reliability with a single barrier subject to a Poisson failure process would require a MTTF of 107 yearsl Values for this Upon comparing this result with the "required" release rate MT1T are also given in Table 1 . p(t) for t<tc, and recalling that l/A. = M'rTF, one can derive the following inequality:
PERFORMANCE CRITE]_IA MTIT > (l/s)105e°ate The discussion of single barrier failure probabilities clearly indicates the need for a quantitative measure of performance.
Suppose we set E to 0.01 (i.e., the release rates during the There is no way to determine what value of reliability we need substantially complete containment period are required to be 1% at any given time unless we consider the consequences of or less of the controlled-release rates). Note that the failure.
After the period of "substantially complete exponential term in the inequality is greater than unity for any containment" of 300 to 1,000 years, the regulatory requirement non-zero value of the decay constant, and that it approaches is to limit the fractional release of each radionuclide to 10-5 per unity for vm'y long-lived radionuclides (the term is year of its inventory remaining at 1,000 years ,_fter closure, approximately 1.001 for a decay constant of 10"6). By setting the exponential term equal to unity, we obtain a lower bound for For the sake of this discussion, '_substantially complete containment" will be defined arbitrarily by limiting the the MTI'F of 107 years. Smaller values of E, or consideration individual radionuclide fractional release rate during the f'h,'st of shorter-lived radionuclides, would require an even longer 1,000 years to a fraction, _, of the controlled release allowance MT'rF.
of 10-5 per year. We may require e to be small, say 0.01, 0.001, This analysis shows that we may indeed n_d a reliability or whatever seems both tolerable and achievable, but it cannot function of 0.9999 at 1,000 years after placement in order to be set at zero if the repository program is to have any credibility, accomplish _substantially complete containment." Failures in If we let 8k(t) be the cumulative release of radionuclide species such a robust single-bat'der package would be _ rare that they k, normalized by its 1,000-year inventory, and p(t) be the would almost certainly not be observed even in 100 years of allowed release requirement, then the system succeeds so long testing. Even if such a package could be built, there is no as apparent way to test it and demonstrate its performance.
8k(t) < p(t), where MULTIPLE BARRIERS p(t) = 10"5ct, for 0<t<t c The specific results given above obviously depend strongly upon the assumed form of the failure pdf, but the difficulty of = 10-5E tc+ 10"5(t-tc), for t > tc, testing a long-lived system remains even for other distributions. The shape of the exponential distribution is particularly and tc is the time for which substantially complete containment trouble.some, since the highest rate of failure occurs near time zero (even though the hazard function is constant), requiring an is required (usually set to 1,000 years), extraordinarily large MrrF to control early releases, There is
Consider the ease of a single barrier and a radionuclide with some hope, however, ff we consider multiple independent barriers. An important result of probability theory is the Central , decay constant ¢xk. As discussed in a previous section, ke'ktdt Limit Theorem,which, under fairly broad conditions, assures us is the probability that the barrier will fail at a time between t that the sum of n indc:pendent random variables (no matter how and t + dr; the total repository inventory, Ik(t) of radionuclide k they are distributed) is a random variable whose distribution is approaches the normal (or Gaussian) distribution for sufficiently large values of n. The mean of the resulting normal distibution is the sum of the means of the individual variables and its Ik(t) = lk(O)e'akt ' variance is the sum of the variances.
What this means is that if we add up enough independent and more toward the mean with increasing n, and the exponentially-distributed failure times--one for each barrier--distribution also becomes more symmetric and more sharply the resulting total failure time will have its mode (i.e., maximum peaked about the mean, lending some graphic plausibility to the in the pdf) shifted away from the origin --in fact it will be operation of the Central Limit Theorem. Also, the area under approximately centered on the mean, and the probability of the curves from t=0 to t=total Mq[q_ is reduced as n increases --failure at early time will be drastically reduced in comparison i.e., the reliability at early time is increased relative to the single with the exponential distribution, barrier ease. waiting time distribution for each barrier is exponential, with The coefficients can be expressed in terms of the hj using the of 1,000lh. method of partial fractions.
2. If the _ are identically equal to a fixed value, _., for ali j,
MULITPLE.BARRIER NORMALIZED RELEASE
then the product is just _bn(' 0 = (1 -t'z/_,)-n, which may be The analysis for the single-barrier normalized release of recognized as thecf fora PearsonType IIIdistribution (the radionuclides is easily extended by usingthemultiple-barrier Gamma distribution) 6. pdfinplace ofthesingle-barrier pdf.The resulting expression is:
Of course, it wouldbe possible tohavea mixture ofeasesI and 2, with some variables havingidentical values of _.and 8k(t) = [_J(Z. + Ctk]neaktc{ I-[e'(_'+CXk)t_j[(Z.+Ctk)t]J/jl ]}, others havingdistinct values.The simplest expressions result forcase2,andwillbe usedinthefollowing analyses, since this will adequately illustrate thevalueofusingmultiple barriers, wherethesummationindex j ranges from0 ton-I,and n isthe total numberofbarriers.
With an obvious changeinnotation, thepdf corresponding tothecfforcase2 ksfoundinRef.6,page930:
Thisfunction and p(t) wereevaluated Ibrtranging from 1 to 10,000 years, with tc fixed at 1000 years and e fiXed at 0.01,
fn(t ) = [_(n_l)[][kt]n-le-Lt"
for n = 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, and 8. Figure 5 shows the resulting plots of 8k(t ) and p(t) for nine combinations of values for the parameters ot and _.. Only combinations for which 8k(t ) never exceeds p(t) By integrating, the cdfand reliability function are obtained:
during the period of regulatory concern successfully meet the "requirements." Note that none of the cases with 100-year n-1 Fn(t) = 1 -e"_z y[kt]J/jl = 1 -Rn(t) MTTF individual barriers meet even the statutory controlled release requirement, and that eight 1,000-year MTrF barriers j=l are not quite adequate.
Note that these expressions reduce to the pdf and cdf, SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION respectively, for a single barrier when n = l. Figure 4 shows b how the shape of the pdf changes as n increases. In Fig. 4, the The results developed in this paper may be summarized in total mean failure time is kept constant at 1,000 years; hence, the following statements (some of these conclusions are each individual mean failure time is 1000/n and gets shorter as n qualitatively correct for failure distributions other than increases. As shown, the mode of the distribution shifts more exponential):
